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PROCEDURALISATION'S TRIUMPH 
AND ENGAGEMENT'S PROMISE 




Three of the Constitutional Court's socio-economic rights decisions of the 2009 term are 
the culmination of a strong trend towards the proceduralisation of socio-economic rights 
that many commentators have argued fails to fulfil their original promise. This triumph of 
proceduralisation undeniably restricts the direct trans formative potential of these rights. 
But there is another aspect to this trend - an aspect reflected in the Court's emphasis 
on participatory democracy and the ability of procedural remedies to democratise the 
rights-enforcement process. This article considers what the triumph of proceduralisation 
means for future social and economic rights litigation and argues that properly developed 
the engagement remedy can give poor people and their advocates an important and power­
ful enforcement tool. At the same time, engagement can help strengthen and promote 
consistent attention to the constitutional values these rights protect. Tapping this potential 
requires the Constitutional Court and lower courts to apply the remedy more consistently, 
to develop its requirements more fully and to apply those requirements robustly where 
government fails to engage meaningfully on social welfare policy. The courts are only the 
starting point, however. For engagement to truly succeed, government must develop com­
prehensive engagement policies and institutionalise those policies at all levels. Finally, 
civil society must expand its role beyond pressing for engagement in individual cases into 
advocating for such institutionalisation. 
Writing for a unanimous Court in the water-rights case Mazibuko v City of 
Johannesburg, Justice Kate O'Regan summarised the reasonableness review 
the Court has applied in each of its socio-economic rights cases: 
A reasonableness challenge requires government to explain the choices it has made. To do so, 
it must provide the information it has considered and the process it has followed to determine 
its policy ... If the process followed by government is flawed or the information gathered is 
obviously inadequate or incomplete, appropriate relief may be sought.' 
She then explained, '[i]n this way, the social and economic rights entrenched 
in our Constitution may contribute to the deepening of democracy. They 
enable citizens to hold government accountable not only through the ballot 
box but also, in a different way, through litigation'.2 
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This is the strongest statement yet of the Court's preference for procedural 
remedies that promote political solutions when addressing social and economic 
rights claims. But, as O'Regan J herself described in a survey of the Court's 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence preceding this summary, it is consistent 
with the Court's approach in nearly all of those decisions.3 
This concern with procedure and the democratic values it promotes ­
what the Court often calls 'participatory democracy"' - is evident in three 
other socio-economic-rights decisions of the 2009 term. In Joseph v City 
ofJohannesburg - in which the Court upheld a challenge by Johannesburg 
residents to the City's failure to provide adequate process before terminating 
electricity services - the Court emphasised that '[c]ompliance by local gov­
ernment with its procedural fairness obligations is crucial therefore, not only 
for the protection of citizens' rights, but also to facilitate trust in the public 
administration and in our participatory democracy'. 5 
In Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement of SA v Premier of the Province 
of KwaZulu-Natal, a Durban-based shack-dweller's movement challenged 
the constitutionality of the KwaZulu-Natal Elimination and Prevention of 
Re-emergence of Slums Act 6 of 2007 arguing that the eviction provisions (s 
16) of the Act violated s 26 of the Constitution, in particular the newly estab­
lished engagement requirement.6 After rejecting Justice Yacoob's expansive 
interpretation that the Act could be read to require mitigating procedures, 
including engagement, prior to eviction, the Court held the Act invalid for 
its failure to 'ensure that [residents'] housing rights are not violated without 
proper notice and consideration of other alternatives'.7 
Finally, in Residents ofJoe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha 
Homes, the Court revisited the engagement remedy - this time deploying it 
to return some measure of control to the more than 20,000 residents whose 
eviction it approved as part of the N2 redevelopment project. 8 Despite finding 
3 	 Ibid para 65 (in its earlier cases, '[t]he Court did not seek to draft policy or to determine its content. 
Instead, having found that the policy adopted by government did not meet the required constitu­
tional standard of reasonableness, the Court, in Grootboom, required government to revise its policy 
to provide for those most in need and, in Treatment Action Campaign No 2, to remove anomalous 
restrictions'). The one notable exception is Khosa v Minister ofSocial Development 2004 ( 6) SA 
505 (CC) in which the Court ordered the government to extend social welfare benefits to permanent 
residents. As Jackie Dugard has pointed out, however, the exceptional willingness to set policy 
directly in Khosa may be attributable to the equally strong s 9 equality dimension of the case. See J 
Dugard 'Courts and the Poor in South Africa: A Critique of Systemic Judicial Failures to Advance 
Transformative Justice (2008) 24 SAJHR 214, 235. Moreover, even in that case the Court merely 
extended a benefit created by the legislature rather than crafting a completely new one. 
4 	 The Court has expressed concern with developing participatory democracy in contexts outside 
of the socio-economic rights case. See Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National 
Assembly 2006 (6) SA416 (CC) Matatiele Municipality v President ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa 
2006 (5) SA47 (CC). 
5 	 2010 ( 4) SA 55 (CC) para 46. Joseph principally deals with the Promotion ofAdministrative Justice 
Act 3 of2000 (PAJA). But the residents argued that the City's termination without sufficient notice 
violated their right to access to adequate housing under s 26 of the Constitution, which, broadly 
understood, puts the case in the realm of socio-economic rights decisions. 
6 2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC). 
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that the City of Cape Town had meaningfully engaged with the residents, the 
Court issued a detailed order and agenda requiring the City to engage further 
over the timing and details of the eviction process - a requirement that ulti­
mately led to the City's decision to postpone the eviction plans and reconsider 
the in situ upgrade the residents had sought.9 The Court recently responded 
by setting aside its original eviction order because the government's 21-month 
delay in proceeding with the eviction and apparent decision to pursue in 
situ upgrade instead rendered the original order - and most importantly the 
engagement process it required - impossible to implement.10 
Taken together, these cases are the culmination of a strong trend towards 
the proceduralisation of socio-economic rights that many commentators have 
argued fails to fulfil their original promise.11 This triumph of proceduralisa­
tion undeniably restricts the direct transformative potential of these rights. 
But there is another aspect to this trend - an aspect reflected in the Court's 
emphasis on participatory democracy and the ability ofprocedural remedies to 
democratise the rights-enforcement process. Engagement is the most concrete 
manifestation of this aspect and, as the Joe Slovo result partially illustrates, 
robust development of engagement promises to address some of the concerns 
that proceduralisation raises. It also offers an alternative mechanism for 
enforcing social and economic rights largely outside of direct litigation. 
This article considers what the triumph of proceduralisation means for 
future social and economic rights litigation and argues that, properly devel­
oped engagement can give poor people and their advocates an important 
and powerful enforcement tool.12 At the same time, engagement can help 
strengthen and promote consistent attention to the constitutional values these 
rights protect. Tapping this potential requires the Constitutional Court and 
lower courts to apply the remedy more consistently, to develop its require­
ments more fully and to apply those requirements robustly where government 
fails to engage meaningfully on social welfare policy. The courts are only the 
starting point, however. For engagement to truly succeed, government must 
develop comprehensive engagement policies and institutionalise those poli­
9 The government's decision to postpone and reconsider was reported by A Majavu 'Evictions 
Suspended- Shack Dwellers Reprieved' Sowetan (4 September 2009). 
I 0 In the matter between Residents ofJoe Slovo Community, Western Cape CCT 22/08 [2011] paras 
30-1 (Joe Slovo II). 
11 	 Danie Brand coined the term 'proceduralisation' in D Brand 'The Proceduralisation ofSouth African 
Socio-Economic Rights Jurisprudence, or "What Are Socio-Economic Rights For?"' in H Botha, 
A van der Walt & J van der Walt (eds) Rights and Democracy in a Transformative Constitution 
(2003) 33. David Bilchitz has been a consistent critic of the Court's failure to incorporate a 
minimum core requirement and its preference for procedural remedies. See D Bilchitz 'Towards a 
Reasonable Approach to the Minimum Core: Laying the Foundations for Future Socio-Economic 
Rights Jurisprudence' (2003) 19 SAJHR I, 8-11. More recently, Theunis Roux has characterised the 
Court's socio-economic rights jurisprudence as part ofa broader attempt to preserve its institutional 
security against the African National Congress (ANC). See T Roux 'Principle and Pragmatism on 
the Constitutional Court of South Africa' (2009) 7 Int J Con L 106, 106. Jackie Dugard has also 
criticised the Court's cases as anti-poor. See Dugard (note 3 above). 
12 	 Because of its focus on engagement, this article deals primarily with the Joe S/ovo decision and 
earlier, related, decisions. 
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cies at all levels. Finally, civil society must expand its role beyond pressing for 
engagement in individual cases into advocating for such institutionalisation. 
WHAT Is ENGAGEMENT? 
Lilian Chenwi and Kate Tissington recently published a handbook for com­
munities outlining the engagement remedy and what it requires.13 As they 
describe it '[m]eaningful engagement is an important development in the 
approach of the courts to enforce socio-economic rights and promote active 
participation in service provision'.14 
Chenwi and Tissington note that the Court discussed the concept in earlier 
cases, most notably Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers, 15 but 
it first applied the remedy in Occupiers of51 Olivia Road, Berea Township 
and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City of Johannesburg - a case chal­
lenging the eviction and relocation of several inner-city residents as part of 
Johannesburg's redevelopment programme.16 
Olivia Road held that engagement is required by several constitutional 
rights, including the right to access to adequate housing and the rights to life 
and human dignity, and also described several key features of engagement.17 
First, engagement does not presuppose any substantive outcome. For example, 
in the housing context, some situations require 'mak[ing] permanent housing 
available and, in others, to provide no housing at all. The possibilities between 
these extremes are almost endless'.18 Second, in most cases engagement can­
not be 'ad hoc'.19 This means that long-term planning for social welfare policy 
must involve engagement with affected citizens from the start and requires a 
cadre of 'competent sensitive council workers skilled in engagement'.20 Third, 
civil society groups have a constitutionally recognised role to assist vulner­
able populations in the engagement process and to 'facilitate the engagement 
process in every possible way'.21 Finally, the government must develop and 
maintain a public record of each engagement so that courts can later review 
not only the outcome but also the engagement process: 'the provision of a 
complete and accurate account of the process of engagement including at least 
the reasonable efforts of the municipality with that process would ordinarily 
be essential'.22 This is important because '[t]he absence of any engagement 
or the unreasonable response of a municipality in the engagement process 
13 L Chenwi & K Tissington 'Engaging Meaningfully with Government on Socio-Economic Rights: 
A Focus on the Right to Housing' (2010) <http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/ 
socio-economic-rights/ser-publications>. 
14 Ibid 8. 
15 2004 (12) BCLR 1268 (CC). 
16 2008 (5) BCLR 475 (CC). 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid para 18. 
19 Ibid para 19. 
20 Ibid para 19. 
21 Ibid para 20. 
22 Ibid para 21. 
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would ordinarily be a weighty consideration against the grant of an ejectment 
order'. 23 
Since Olivia Road, the Court has used the remedy in only two other cases 
and discussed it in several others. In Mamba v Minister ofSocial Development, 
the Court ordered the Gauteng government and others to engage with repre­
sentatives of internally displaced refugees of the anti-immigrant violence that 
swept South Africa in early 2008 over the timing and procedures for clos­
ing the refugee camps.24 The engagement order in that case largely mirrored 
the Olivia Road order but added a lengthy list of specific organisations with 
which the government entities were required to engage.25 Unlike Olivia Road, 
in which engagement successfully settled the dispute, in Mamba, the Gauteng 
government largely ignored the Court's order and interpreted its obligations 
as limited to reporting the continuing progress of its closure plans rather than 
negotiating over those plans.26 The plaintiffs sought dismissal of the case as 
moot once the camps were closed and so the Court never addressed the issue 
whether the government's cribbed interpretation was consistent with the 
engagement order.27 
More recently, in Joe Slovo, the Court incorporated a detailed engagement 
order as a condition for permitting the City of Cape Town to proceed with the 
eviction of over 20,000 residents of the Joe Slovo settlement. 28 Two aspects 
of Joe Slovo represent important innovations in the Court's use of engage­
ment. First, it shows that courts can use engagement to return some measure 
of control to the parties following a substantive decision on the merits in a 
socio-economic rights case. Second, the detailed engagement order is a good 
example of a more court-directed form of engagement than in either Olivia 
Road or Mamba. Both features show that engagement can involve relatively 
strong court control and also that it can be combined with partial or complete 
resolution of substantive legal issues while still maintaining some flexibility 
over the implications of a particular interpretation.29 
Collectively, these decisions sketch the rough outline of a highly flexible 
and potentially important aspect of the socio-economic rights (and possibly 
other) provisions in the Constitution. It is clear that government has an obliga­
tion to engage - and engage early- whenever it develops social welfare policy 
and certainly well before any threat of litigation emerges. Citizens affected 
by those policies and civil society organisations have a constitutional claim 
23 Ibid. 

24 CCT 65/08, Court Order dated 21 August 2008 {CC). 

25 Ibid para 5. 

26 Mamba Duncan Breen 's September 2008 affidavit in terms of para 3 of the Court order dated 21 

August 2008, 8, 22, 31-43 (describing the sequence of events following the order and conclud­
ing: 'In my view one cannot describe [the single meeting the Gauteng government attended) as a 
"meaningful engagement" as required by the Constitutional Court order'). 
27 CoRMSA press release (16 October 2008). 
28 Joe Slovo (note 8 above) para 7. 
29 I develop this idea more fully in 'Engagement's Possibilities and Limits as a Socioeconomic Rights 
Remedy' (forthcoming 2010) Washington U Global Studies L Rev. 
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to seek engagement and should be able to enforce their right to engagement 
through litigation. 
On the other end of the spectrum, courts can inquire whether the govern­
ment has adequately engaged with affected citizens in every case challenging 
social-welfare policies and to order further engagement where necessary. 
When ordering engagement, courts after Joe Slovo have the authority to 
control the engagement agenda and to order engagement with non-parties. 
Courts can also combine engagement with partial or complete substantive 
determinations of the legal issues in the case. 
Beyond these very general parameters, however, when and how government 
must engage remains unclear and this lack of clarity hampers the effective­
ness of the remedy. Perhaps most important is the lack of a direct precedent 
sanctioning the government's failure to engage meaningfully - both Joe Slovo 
and Mamba were missed opportunities for enforcing Olivia Road's statement 
that the lack of meaningful engagement can itself be grounds for refusing 
to permit government to proceed with implementation of a policy. But it is 
not only the courts that must develop engagement. The government and civil 
society are equal players and have constitutional roles to establish policies, 
procedures and standards for engagement even absent court direction. 
The Court's recent reversal ofthe Joe Slovo eviction order both underscores 
the importance ofengagement and the difficulties and uncertainties surround­
ing implementation of the process.30 The Court highlighted the central role 
that engagement played in the original eviction order to explain why the 
21-month delay required lifting it. It cited four reasons why the parties could 
no longer comply with the order. First, the government no longer planned to 
relocate residents; second, the original timetable (including the time-frame 
for engagement) had become irrelevant; third, '[t]here has been little or no 
engagement in relation to the relocation process nor is there likely to be any 
engagement in relation to relocation in the future'; and, finally, much of the 
order served no purpose without relocation, engagement and the division of 
residents into those who could return and those who could not.31 Summing up 
the net effect of abandoning relocation and the consequent need for engage­
ment over its details, the Court stated that '[t]he only part of the order that 
would remain if all of these aspects fall away is the bare, unconditional, order 
requiring all the applicants ... to vacate the Joe Slovo area'. 32 In other words, 
the right to evict without the corresponding duty to comply with the detailed 
and carefully structured engagement order was no longer 'just and equitable' 
under all the circumstances.33 
It is also important to note that the opportunity for the Court to address 
these changed circumstances was a direct result of the detailed time-frame 
30 It is also worth noting that this decision is one of the first in which the newly configured Court 
has addressed the engagement remedy. Joe Slovo II (note 10 above) paras 18-9 (noting that seven 
members of the Court participating in this decision did not participate in the first decision). 
31 Ibid para 30. 
32 Ibid para 31. 
33 Ibid. 
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and reporting requirements that the Court included as part of the engagement 
order.34 
In the high-profile and politically sensitive context of the mass eviction 
of the Joe Slovo community, the Court was able to muster the institutional 
energy to address the government's delayed response and to take the highly 
unusual step of reversing its own decision on the basis of those changed cir­
cumstances. But it will not always be possible for courts to shift course and 
correct their own orders where the underlying situation has changed. More 
importantly, the substantial uncertainty over how courts can and should struc­
ture engagement orders and subsequent interventions like this one makes the 
potential benefits of the process highly contingent and uncertain. 
Before turning to some initial suggestions for how courts, government 
and civil society can begin to develop engagement, I will briefly outline the 
theoretical underpinnings of engagement - in particular, the relationship 
between engagement and participatory democracy that the Court has empha­
sised. Drawing this connection helps to explain how engagement can become 
an important tool not only for enforcing the socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution but also for developing a sustained commitment to constitutional 
democracy more generally. 
II ENGAGEMENT AS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 
Theunis Roux has argued that the Constitutional Court's approach to 
socio-economic rights is representative of what he calls the Court's mix of 
pragmatism and principle in constitutional adjudication more generally. 35 With 
the notable exception of the Treatment Action Campaign decisions, he char­
acterises the socio-economic rights cases as pragmatic decisions in which the 
Court has relied on a flexible conception of separation ofpowers and adopted 
context-specific tests to manage its relationship with the political branches.36 
For Roux, the reasonableness test the Court has used in each of its socio­
economic rights cases is a prime example of a pragmatic approach because it 
is case-specific and gives the Court ample room to manoeuvre in subsequent 
cases that might have serious political overtones.37 He contrasts this pragma­
tism with other instances in which the Court was able to take a harder - and, 
in his view, more principled - approach either because the African National 
Congress (ANC) supported the decision or because it aligned with broader 
public opinion despite ANC opposition.38 
By focusing on the political undercurrents of the cases he selects, Roux's 
analysis highlights an important dimension ofthose cases and provides a more 
complete picture of the disputes involved. But Roux's claim that whenever the 
Court adopts a context-specific test, like the reasonableness test, the Court is 
34 Ibid paras 5-16 (describing the parties' negotiations and the Court's responses). 







38 Ibid 137-8. 

114 	 (2011) 27 SAJHR 
acting out of institutional self-interest and ignores the Court's emphasis on 
participatory democracy. Taking that aspect into account provides an alter­
native - and importantly, principled - explanation for the Court's approach. 
Rather than simply setting up room to manoeuvre in a future case with poten­
tial political consequences, the flexibility of the reasonableness test generally 
- and the engagement remedy specifically - is designed to create interaction 
between affected citizens and the government over the constitutional values 
these rights represent. 
Viewed from this perspective, the socio-economic rights decisions are part 
of the Court's larger interest in using its decisions to develop a broad-based 
and sustained commitment to constitutional democracy in South Africa. This 
is, I think, what the Court means when it speaks of participatory democracy 
- a dialogue between the government and the citizens it serves over constitu­
tional values. 39 
Procedural remedies like engagement promote that kind of dialogue and 
thus give the courts an important role to play while still democratising the 
process of constitutional development. The result is a collaborative model of 
constitutional development in which courts, citizens and the political branches 
each participate in negotiating the meaning of the Constitution. 
While Roux is clearly correct that the flexibility of remedies like engage­
ment allow the Court in many cases to avoid direct confrontation with the 
political branches over policy decisions, the Court's interest in avoiding such 
conflict is as much driven by a desire to give these rights effect while initiat­
ing a national conversation over what they require as it is in preserving itself. 
In this respect, the Court is responding to the problem of building legitimacy 
identified by James Gibson and Gregory Caldiera in a series of surveys of the 
South African public's views of the Constitutional Court. Gibson and Caldiera 
conducted a panel survey of South Africans in 1996 and 1997 to test if what 
they call 'legitimacy theory' applies to the Constitutional Court.40 Legitimacy 
theory hypothesises that courts achieve the moral authority necessary to 
obtain compliance with controversial decisions where the society 'view[s] 
courts as appropriate institutions for such decisions' and have a 'dedication to 
the health and efficacy ofan institution [that] overrides dissatisfaction with its 
immediate outputs'.41 Their initial survey results showed that the Court lacked 
substantial legitimacy.42 
Gibson conducted a follow-up survey in 2004 to study if the Constitutional 
Court and the South African Parliament had developed legitimacy over time. 
39 	 In 'Demosprudence in Comparative Perspective' (forthcoming 2010) Stanford J of Int law, I 
develop a more extended response to Roux and identify engagement as one of several examples of 
the Court's broad concern with participatory democracy. 'Demosprudence' is a concept developed 
by L Guinier & G Torres in 'Forward: Demosprudence Through Dissent' (2008) 122 Harvard l Rev 
4. 
40 J Gibson & G Caldiera 'Defenders of Democracy? Legitimacy, Popular Acceptance, and the South 
African Constitutional Court' (2003) 65 J Pol I. 
41 Ibid2. 
42 Ibid 3. 
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In this study, Gibson tested what he calls 'a theory of "positivity bias"'.43 
Positivity bias posits that courts gain institutional legitimacy when citizens 
are repeatedly exposed to the symbols of the court itself, because such expo­
sure develops an understanding and expectation that courts are separate from 
regular politics. Gibson explains that it is repeated exposure that is important, 
not necessarily the substantive outcome that results in the exposure. Therefore, 
'even when the initial stimulus for paying attention to courts is negative (for 
example a controversial court decision), judicial symbols enhance legitimacy 
' 44 
Gibson concluded that from 1996 to 2004 public support for the 
Constitutional Court has slowly grown - with significant differences among 
different racial and ethnic groups.45 He argued that two things must happen 
for South Africa's democratic experiment to continue to succeed. The first 
is that 'a democratic political culture must be nourished. Both the citizens 
and the elites must commit themselves to the institutions and processes of 
democracy'.46 The second is that 'effective and legitimate political institutions 
must be created and sustained'.47 In Gibson's view 'the Constitutional Court 
is particularly important on this score, especially since the dominant problem 
of African democracies today is their illiberalism (their lack of respect for 
minority rights)'.48 
Engagement dovetails nicely with this prescription because it gives courts a 
tool to actively manage a process of exposure both to the judiciary itself and, 
more importantly, to the constitutional principles that its judgments enforce. 
Engagement requires the political branches to pay specific attention to their 
constitutional responsibilities when developing social policies and to consult 
citizens on their own views of what the Constitution requires. Applied con­
sistently this creates the opportunity for sustained and repeated exposure to 
the Constitution - precisely the kind ofexposure that Gibson says is necessary 
to develop legitimacy over time. The courts act as managers of this process 
intervening where necessary to ensure that engagement is meaningful and 
determining when additional engagement is necessary. 
III DEVELOPING ENGAGEMENT 
For engagement to act as a legitimacy-creating mechanism, however, requires 
courts to continue to develop the remedy, and, in particular, to intervene where 
government fails meaningfully to engage. It also requires the state to commit 
to a comprehensive development of engagement policies and procedures and 
institutionalisation of those policies and procedures throughout the admin­
43 J Gibson 'The Evolving Legitimacy of the South African Constitutional Court' in F du Bois & S du 
Bois-Pedain (eds) Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South Africa (2009) 233. 
44 Ibid 234. 
45 Ibid 260-2. 
46 Ibid 262-3. 
47 Ibid 263. 
48 Ibid. 
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istrative state. Finally, civil society must expand its role beyond facilitating 
specific engagements into advocating for such comprehensive development 
and institutionalisation, including by using its experience and expertise to 
offer suggestions for engagement policy. 
The Socio-Economic Rights Project of the Community Law Centre at the 
University ofWestern Cape and the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of South 
Africa (SERI) co-hosted a roundtable on engagement in March 2010 that took 
the first steps towards addressing the many unanswered questions engagement 
raises.49 Participants included representatives of civil society organisations, 
public interest lawyers, community leaders and government officials. The 
willingness of those diverse players to recognise the potential importance of 
engagement and to work together to begin a process for developing it is in 
itself an important step. However, a central theme of the roundtable was the 
tremendous uncertainty surrounding engagement and the immense practical 
problems that conducting meaningful engagement poses. In the following 
paragraphs, I offer some very preliminary suggestions for addressing some of 
the questions and challenges that the roundtable raised. 
(a) Institutionalising engagement 
One ofthe major issues ofthe discussions was the lack ofa clear understanding 
of the role government should play in engaging affected communities during 
the policy-development process. Related to this, Lauren Royston, a principal 
at Development Works and advisor to the Centre for Applied Legal Studies 
(CALS) at the University of the Witwatersrand, said that many organisations 
and activists feel that the Court's precedents to date 'plac[e] too much respon­
sibility on NGOs and communities with insufficient emphasis on the role the 
state (government) should perform'.50 
Participants also noted that, even where government is willing to engage, 
the process raises significant practical difficulties, including deciding at what 
point to engage with affected communities, defining relevant communities 
and stakeholders, establishing effective channels of communication, and 
determining at what point it has sufficiently engaged despite the lack of a 
clear consensus. 
There is no doubt that the Constitutional Court and lower courts have much 
work to do in defining more specifically the role that government should play 
and, in particular in insisting that when government fails to engage it will not 
be permitted to implement the resulting policy. But Olivia Road imposes a 
key programmatic requirement - that government avoids ad hoc engagement 
whenever possible and that doing so requires a cadre of employees trained in 
engagement.51 This means that government at all levels must begin to develop 
49 'Report on the Roundtable Discussion on Meaningful Engagement in the Realisation of Socio­
Economic Rights' (4 March 2010) (Roundtable) <http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ 
clc-projects/socio-economic-rights/confererence/previous-conference>. 
50 Ibid 5. 

51 Olivia Road (note 16 above) para 21. 
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a bureaucratic structure focused on engagement. A robust implementation 
of this requirement would itself go a long way towards alleviating many of 
the problems the roundtable participants identified. A bureaucratic structure 
focused on engagement can help bring· consistent attention to the state's 
engagement obligations and the underlying constitutional values engagement 
is intended to protect. 
Trevor Mitchell, the head of housing and policy research for the City of 
Cape Town, stated during the roundtable discussion that engagement typically 
takes place at the project level.52 This was confirmed by Myrtle Stuurman, 
assistant director of policy in the Department of Local Government and 
Housing for the Western Cape.53 While the specific negotiations of each 
individual engagement clearly must relate to specific projects, government 
officials should take a much broader view of their engagement responsibilities 
and work to develop a more generalised capacity for engagement outside of 
specific projects. To ensure systematic implementation of engagement, gov­
ernment must adopt a more comprehensive approach that does not reinvent 
new engagement policies and practices each time a project reaches the plan­
ning and implementation stage. Royston's call for a comprehensive strategy 
on engagement in the eviction context and for a broader strategic discussion 
is one way to get governments to begin thinking about engagement in a more 
systematic way. 54 
Institutionalising engagement in this way can help alleviate the problem 
of lack of cohesion that was a repeated theme in the roundtable discussion. 
Officials with training and experience are more likely to become adept at deal­
ing with internal community conflict and can bring opposed groups together 
in the engagement process. By contrast where engagement is conducted ad 
hoc by officials whose primary role involves substantive service delivery 
there is a real risk engagement will fail for lack of proper training. Moreover, 
more consistent engagement is possible where a government has a permanent 
infrastructure devoted to the process. Lilian Chenwi's suggestion that govern­
ment establish an outreach programme for communities is one example of the 
kind of institutional functions this bureaucratisation can perform.55 
Institutionalisation should also enhance the capacity and willingness of 
government to approach engagement from a holistic rather than narrow per­
spective. Creating a bureaucratic structure tasked specifically with developing 
an engagement programme and policies for implementing the engagement 
requirement creates the kind of sustained and long-term focus on the process 
necessary to make engagement a meaningful process. Over time, officials 
focused on engagement can begin to develop best practices for engagement 
that can be applied across programmes. 
52 Roundtable (note 49 above) 8. 

53 Ibid 10. 

54 Ibid 11. 

55 Ibid 8. 
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Charles Epp's work on the development of what he calls the 'legalized 
accountability' administrative model offers important insights into both the 
mechanism for developing this institutionalisation and its potential to make 
engagement into a meaningful process for protecting social and economic 
rights. 56 Epp argues that '[i]n the modern state, rights are empty promises 
in many contexts unless they are given life in administrative policies and 
practices'.57 He has documented a shift in a range of areas in which 'U.S. 
administrative governance became significantly, even dramatically more 
rights-focused; the rights policies at the heart ofthe change became institution­
alized and integrated into government agencies in substantial administrative 
depth'. 58 
In a recent book, Epp analyses evidence of the development of the legalised 
accountability model in three areas: police use of force, workplace sexual har­
assment, and playground safety in the United States and the United Kingdom. 59 
In each instance, organisation and bureaucratic reforms to protect civil rights 
developed in response to social-movement group pressure, including legal pres­
sure. Epp emphasises that the model made rights real through 'administrative 
systems that are legally framed and comprehensive, encompassing a range of 
mechanisms for changing individual behavior and organizational culture' to 
advance new norms.60 Epp identifies three characteristics these mechanisms 
share: (1) 'administrative policies that state an organizational commitment to 
legal norms ... '; (2) 'training and communication systems intended to convey 
the importance of these policies and to change organizational culture in keep­
ing with them'; and (3) 'internal oversight aimed at assessing progress in this 
endeavour and identifying violations of the policy'.61 
Epp's principal example of this model is the development of institutional­
ised policies and practices to address the problem of police brutality in the 
1960s and 1970s in the US. Epp notes that a key report to the US President's 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice in 1967 
outlined the basic framework for the legalised accountability model.62 After 
concluding that the problem required developing centralised policies, the 
Report described what Epp calls the essential elements of the model: 
Rules: Departments, relying on careful internal research into 'problem areas', should system­
atically develop clear internal administrative rules governing officer discretion. Departments, 
the report urged, should employ internal legal advisers to aid in developing such policies. 
Training: After adopting such rules, departments should systematically disseminate them 
so that all officers are aware of them, and should provide ongoing training so that officers 
know how to follow policies in practice. Oversight: After such implementation, departments 
56 C Epp Making Rights Real: Activists, Bureaucrats, and the Creation ofthe Legalist State (2009). 
57 C Epp 'Implementing the Rights Revolution: Repeat Players and the Interpretation of Diffuse Legal 
Messages' (2008) 71 Law & Contemp Probs 41. 
58 Ibid 42. 
59 Epp (note 56 above) 216. 
60 Ibid 25. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid 47-9. 
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should carry out ongoing review of the policies' effectiveness and should devise appropriate 
methods of 'internal control' over officers' actions." 
While the problem of developing engagement policies is not directly analo­
gous to reforming police practices, there are sufficient similarities that the 
model Epp describes can be usefully adapted. Taking the key elements in 
turn, research-based rules for conducting engagement could be developed 
over time and through a centralised and consistent framework. Rather than 
using internal legal advisers, in the engagement context, professionals trained 
in alternative dispute resolution technique and theory would be the more 
appropriate place to look for analogous guidance in developing specific rules 
for when and how to engage. 
The role of training is obvious but reinforces the need for institutionalisa­
tion. Once government develops engagement policies and procedures, it must 
disseminate those policies and train officials to implement them. Unlike in 
the police context, the challenge for engagement is not to reform the practices 
of an existing professional culture. Instead, it requires building a new one to 
implement engagement on a consistent and sustained basis. While in many 
respects that challenge is much easier because it does not involve altering an 
entrenched culture, it will require redeploying scarce resources. 
Finally, oversight would play out in a very different way for an institution­
alised approach to engagement than for police-reform. It will be important 
to ensure that individual engagements are conducted in compliance with the 
centralised policies and procedures, but the real focus of oversight should 
be the development of best practices for engagement. Each engagement will 
bring its own specific challenges and require adaptation of the basic model, 
but some aspects ofengagement can be generalised and applied systematically 
across engagements. Abstracting these broader lessons from each individual 
engagement and using them to improve the centralised engagement policies 
and procedures allows for an iterative process of continual improvement over 
time. 
Susan Sturm's and Howard Gadlin's analysis of the Center for Cooperative 
Resolution/Office of the Ombudsman (CCR) at the US National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) offers a potentially useful set of principles for developing best 
practices for engagement.64 CCR is a conflict resolution programme within 
NIH that, in addition to resolving specific disputes within the organisation, 
has sought to identify systemic issues within those disputes and develop solu­
tions to those issues over time. Sturm and Gadlin analysed CCR's programme 
and identified four elements of a conflict-resolution process capable of gener­
ating systemic change: '(1) a boundary-spanning institutional intermediary, 
(2) root cause methodology, (3) institutional legitimacy within communities 
of practice, and (4) participatory accountability'.65 
63 Ibid 49. 

64 S Sturm & H Gadlin 'Conflict Resolution and Systemic Change' (2007) J Disp Resol 1. 

65 Ibid 39. 
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An institutionalised approach to engagement could be structured similarly 
to CCR - something like an engagement department - and incorporate each 
of these elements. Instead of focused on the internal operations ofa particular 
government entity, such an engagement department would be tasked with 
developing policy and procedures for engagement across substantive policy 
areas, with housing as the obvious initial target given the Court's development 
of engagement within the eviction process. Establishing a separate entity 
within government would satisfy Sturm's and Gadlin's first requirement of a 
boundary-spanning intermediary, which they argue is necessary to identify 
systemic problems across individual interventions.66 Like the CCR, a separate 
engagement department could more easily identify patterns among individual 
engagements and refine the engagement process to respond more effectively 
in particular situations. 
Separating engagement from the government department responsible for 
developing substantive policy would also create the kind of dual insider/out­
sider perspective that Sturm and Gadlin identify as a key strength of CCR.67 
This is critical for Sturm's and Gadlin's second element - root-cause analysis. 
Root-cause analysis simply means identifying systemic issues that give rise 
to individual disputes and identifying solutions to address those issues on 
a broader scale. Applied to engagement, root-cause analysis could take at 
least two forms. First, it would mean developing the kind of best practices 
for engagement I suggested earlier. Second, it could also involve identifying 
systemic issues in the policy-development processes used by government at 
different levels that give rise to community protest. 
Divorcing engagement from substantive policy development would also put 
those involved in a position to interact more freely with affected communi­
ties and civil society organisations active on socio-economic rights issues. As 
more neutral players, engagement officials would have greater credibility with 
these external constituencies and also greater capacity to develop the institu­
tional legitimacy within those communities that Sturm and Gadlin identify as 
the third element of CCR's successful model. 
Finally, participatory accountability means that the results of each engage­
ment as well as the details of the engagement process must be subject to public 
comment and reaction and there must be a mechanism for incorporating those 
critiques into revised engagement policies. As the roundtable participants 
noted, transparency in and monitoring of individual engagements is crucial.68 
The public-reporting requirement Olivia Road established can play a key role 
here by requiring that government document the processes of each engage­
ment and make those reports available for public comment by citizens and 
organisations that were not directly involved. 
66 Ibid 40. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Roundtable (note 49 above) 16. 
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(b) Civil society pressure 
As noted above, the roundtable participants expressed concern over the 
Court's emphasis on the role ofNGOs and civil society groups. This concern 
is valid and the government itself must begin to assume a leadership role. But 
Epp's work suggests that civil society has a critical role to play not merely in 
assisting individual engagements but, more importantly, in applying consist­
ent pressure on government to institutionalise its approach to engagement. 
Success on that broader programmatic level can create the kind of institutional 
capacity that will relieve pressure on civil society over the long term. 
To be sure, social rights advocates must continue to assist in individual 
engagements. And one key issue on that level is ensuring groups represent the 
views of the community. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) active on 
particular issues bring the advantage of a broader understanding of the issue 
on a national level and can bring that broader perspective to the discussion. 
At the same time, however, they must ensure that the views of the particular 
community or communities directly affected are adequately presented. As 
S'bu Zikode, a leader ofthe Abahlali shack-dwellers movement eloquently put 
it in his statement at a meeting on engagement hosted by CALS: 
It is one thing if we are beneficiaries who need delivery. It is another thing if we are citizens 
who want to shape the future of our cities, even our country. It is another thing if we are 
human beings who have decided that it is our duty to humanize the world.69 
Civil society's role in individual engagement is to empower citizens to play 
the kind of active role this describes and which participatory democracy 
envisions. 
In addition to paying careful attention to their role in individual engage­
ments, however, social rights advocates should expand their efforts to include 
advocacy - and, where necessary, litigation - to develop an institutionalised 
approach to engagement. Epp notes that despite the call for administrative 
reform by the 1967 report and others, real police reform did not begin to take 
root until the 1980s and 1990s and only then as the result of a strategic liti­
gation campaign focused on establishing liability specifically for the failure 
adequately to train and manage frontline police forces.70 As Epp describes it 
'the development of a legal norm favoring legalized accountability in polic­
ing ... grew less from police departments' innovations than from two other 
sources: activist pressure and a reform campaign among policy experts on the 
border of policing and academia'.71 
Following Epp's model, putting pressure on government to institutionalise 
its approach to engagement will require three elements. The first is a con­
certed political effort to raise the profile of engagement. The roundtable and 
the CALS conference that preceded it are a significant start in this process. 
SERI's proposal for a follow-up housing indaba and the apparent receptivity 
69 'Meaningful Engagement' (24 July 2009) <http://www.abahlali.org/node/5538>. 

70 Epp (note 56 above) 87-90. 

71 Ibid 90. 
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of some government officials to the idea shows further promise.72 It will be 
important, however, to shift the conversation away from the specifics of indi­
vidual engagements into the need for institutionalisation described above. 
This raises the second element of Epp's model: collaboration with policy 
experts and academics. In Epp's account it was not only activist pressure 
and litigation that succeeded in institutionalising police reforms, but also the 
development of practical ideas for administrative reform by policy experts 
with knowledge of the police field but who were based at universities or 
other outside institutions.73 Successful institutionalisation of engagement 
will require developing the same kind of expertise with academics and other 
experts in areas such as urban planning and dispute resolution design. 
The third element is litigation. The conversation that has already started 
over engagement was the direct result of the highly successful effort in Olivia 
Road. Since that remarkable decision, however, engagement has played a 
relatively modest role in litigation. Abahlali represents successful deployment 
of the concept to overturn state policy inconsistent with its values, and Joe 
Slovo - while arguably a failure to enforce meaningful engagement prior to 
eviction - represents a successful use of engagement as a tool for mitigating 
the effects ofa negative court ruling. It also offers an important new model for 
court-directed engagement. But Epp's studies suggest that real reform is most 
likely to develop where the government faces a consistent threat of potential 
liability in litigation for failing to develop administrative reforms. 
(c) Court enforcement 
For the threat of litigation to actually provoke reform thus requires not 
merely activists willing to bring cases, but also courts that are responsive 
to their claims. Kate Tissington pointed out that, despite the relative success 
of engagement in Olivia Road, that experience shows a clear reluctance by 
government to engage on issues other than those that a court directly enforces: 
'[g]overnment addresses only the issues they are ordered to address ... when 
other issues arise, at a later stage, it becomes difficult to get government to 
address these issues'.74 
The Court's few experiences using the engagement remedy reinforce the 
need for relatively strong court involvement at least until the government 
develops an adequate engagement infrastructure. In Mamba the Court's 
repeated engagement orders were almost completely ineffective. The Gauteng 
government simply moved forward with its closure plans and never seri­
ously considered the arguments raised by the refugees.75 If the Court had 
combined the engagement order with a temporary injunction against closing 
72 	 Roundtable (note 49 above) 15---0. 
73 	 Epp (note 56 above) 90-1. 
74 	 Roundtable (note 49 above) 7. 
75 	 See 'Refugees Turfed Out of their Tents' IOL online (7 October 2008) <http://www.iol.eo.za/index. 
php?set_id=l &click_id=3069&art_id=nw2008 l 006 I 72807464Cl 84214>. 
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the camps, the government would have had much greater incentive to engage 
meaningfully. 
The Joe Slovo experience offers further evidence that relatively strong 
court intervention is still necessary to provoke meaningful engagement. As 
Tissington also noted, 'there were strong doubts on the quality of [the pre­
eviction] meaningful engagement' in that case.76 It was only after the Court 
ordered engagement over the details of the eviction process itself - includ­
ing devising a detailed agenda of issues for that engagement and specifically 
requiring reservation of a set percentage of new homes for community 
residents - that the government finally took seriously the possibility of in situ 
upgrade that was a key demand of the residents.77 
The Joe Slovo litigation thus illustrates the difference that strong court 
intervention can make. Prior to the eviction the lower courts refused to 
recognise the government's failure to engage and, like in Mamba, the govern­
ment was able to proceed with its plans. Quoting Justice Albie Sachs, Sandra 
Liebenberg succinctly summarises the inadequacy of the engagement process 
prior to eviction: 
the willingness to effectively condone the inadequate consultation processes raises serious 
concerns. This consultation process was littered with mixed messages conveyed by an array 
of officials, broken promises and, in the words of Judge Albie Sachs, the 'frequent employ­
ment of a top-down approach, where the purpose of reporting back to the community was 
seen as being to pass on information about decisions already taken rather than to involve the 
residents as partners in the process of decision-making itself'." 
Liebenberg goes on to note that, notwithstanding the majority's conclusion 
that the consultations satisfied the government's engagement duties, in fact, 
'[t]his represents the antithesis of the "structured, consistent and careful 
engagement" by "competent, sensitive" officials skilled in engagement which 
the court has previously underscored when state organs seek to evict large 
groups of vulnerable people'.79 
The Court's unwillingness to hold the government accountable for its 
insufficient engagement efforts by at least temporarily delaying the eviction 
directly was a missed opportunity to demonstrate the Court's commitment 
to enforcing Olivia Road's directive that '[t]he absence of any engagement 
or the unreasonable response of a municipality in the engagement process 
would ordinarily be a weighty consideration against the grant ofan ejectment 
order'.80 
76 Roundtable (note 49 above) 4. 

77 Among otber tbings, tbe Joe Slovo order required parties to 'tbe exact time, manner and conditions 

[of relocation]' and 'tbe precise temporary residential accommodation units' for relocation. Joe 
Slovo (note 8 above) paras 11.2-11.3. The government's reversal of its position on eviction was 
reported in the media. See Majavu (note 9 above). 
78 S Liebenberg 'Joe Slovo Eviction: Vulnerable Community Feels the Law from the Top Down' 
<http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=73812>. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Olivia Road(note 16 above) para 21. 
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On the other hand, once the Court ordered the government to engage over 
the details of the eviction process itself, the government was forced to recon­
sider its plans. Unlike the Mamba order that, beyond listing the parties and 
setting a reporting deadline, left the details of engagement to the parties them­
selves, the Joe Slovo order imposed significant constraints. First, the Court 
established a detailed engagement agenda, including 'the exact, time, manner 
and conditions' of the relocation and also 'the precise temporary residential 
accommodation units' for the relocated residents. 81 While well short of an 
injunction stopping the eviction process altogether, this agenda slowed the 
process substantially and provided the residents with substantial leverage with 
the government. 
Second, the Court imposed two substantive requirements for the eviction 
to proceed: it established detailed standards for the temporary accommoda­
tions in Delft, and it ordered the government to allocated 70 per cent of the 
low-cost housing units in Joe Slovo to displaced residents. This represents a 
different form of court control - making substantive determinations regard­
ing plaintiffs' rights and conditioning engagement on the fulfilment of those 
obligations. Unlike establishing an engagement agenda or even a full-scale 
injunction both of which halt or slow the implementation of policy, making 
substantive determinations of this kind sets a baseline for engagement over 
the remaining issues. 
The Court's subsequent reversal of the eviction order further illustrates the 
importance of relatively robust court involvement. As the Court noted, the 
government's decision to abandon wholesale eviction rendered the carefully 
structured engagement order meaningless. While the residents won the overall 
battle to avoid wholesale relocation, the government's opposition to lifting the 
eviction order demonstrated its desire to maintain the authority to evict some 
proportion of the residents - and at the same time to avoid the constraints of 
the original order. The Court's direct intervention to avoid that possibility sets 
up the opportunity for it or a lower court to condition any later eviction on 
further engagement structured to address the situation as it develops. 
With the notable exception ofKhosa, the Court has been extremely reluctant 
to intervene in either of these ways - to slow implementation or make direct 
changes to large-scale social and economic programmes that are already 
well advanced. In Olivia Road the Court's intervention was arguably easier 
because the lower court had issued an injunction and the government had not 
restarted the programme prior to the engagement. 82 Even in Minister ofHealth 
v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) 2002 (5) SA 721 (5 July 2002) - which 
is widely hailed as one of the Court's most muscular enforcement efforts ­
there were clear signs of a shift in go~ernment policy and the Court's order 
81 Joe S/ovo (note 8 above) para 11. 
82 Olivia Road(note 16 above). 
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simply reinforced that shift. 83 For engagement to begin to work in the way the 
Court hopes, however, it must be willing to enjoin government programmes 
in cases where the record demonstrates a lack of real engagement. And, as 
in Joe Slovo, it should be willing to make substantive rights determinations 
where appropriate. In the short run, this will involve greater intervention in 
substantive policy than the Court has typically conducted in the past. But, so 
long as the injunction merely halts progress subject to further engagement, 
then the Court can still avoid directly fashioning social and economic polices. 
Even where it makes a substantive determination, if those determinations 
only partially resolve the issues and are limited to the details of a policy, the 
Court can still avoid wholesale policy-making while providing leverage to 
citizens challenging the policy. Furthermore, Epp's study suggests that, over 
time, strong initial court interventions combined with sustained civil society 
pressure for reform can catalyse the institutionalisation and development of 
a bureaucratic culture committed to engagement that can begin to take the 
courts out of the process altogether. 84 
IV CONCLUSION 
In Port Elizabeth, Justice Sachs introduced engagement for the first time: 
The managerial role of the courts may need to find expression in innovative ways. Thus 
one potentially dignified and effective mode of achieving sustainable reconciliations of the 
different interests involved is to encourage and require the parties to engage with each other 
in a pro-active and honest endeavor to find mutually acceptable solutions. Whenever possi­
ble, face-to-face engagement or mediation through a third-party should replace arms-length 
combat by intransigence opponents." 
The Constitutional Court's and lower court's recent deployments of the 
engagement remedy and civil society's and government's strong interest in 
developing the concept into a practical tool for implementing social and eco­
nomic rights are promising signs that Justice Sachs' vision of a managerial 
court assisting adverse parties to discover mutually acceptable solutions to 
their disputes has begun to take root. But developing engagement's promise 
as an effective remedy will require considerable effort and sustained atten­
tion by the courts, civil society and government. Government must commit 
to developing a robust infrastructure for engagement and to institutionalise 
engagement policies and procedures across the board. To ensure that institu­
tionalisation, the Court itself must be willing to at times step out of its purely 
managerial role and occasionally make substantive determinations of what 
these rights require as well as to prevent government from proceeding with 
policies where engagement was clearly inadequate. Civil society can assist 
in this process through sustained pressure on government and by bringing 
83 See A Kapczynsk & J Berger 'The Story of the TAC Case: The Potential and Limits of Socio­
Economic Rights Litigation in South Africa' in D Hurwitz & M Satterthwaite (eds) Human Rights 
Advocacy Stories. 
84 Epp (note 56 above). 
85 Port Elizabeth (note 15 above) para 39. 
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cases not only to enforce engagement in individual instances but also to call 
attention to government's lack of sufficient institutionalisation. Without such 
sustained effort, engagement runs a real risk of fulfilling the fears of those 
who have objected to the Court's preference for procedural remedies and pro­
ceduralisation's triumph will mean the loss of the transformative potential of 
these rights. 
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